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Abstract. Traitor tracing schemes are cryptographically secure broadcast methods that allow iden-
tification of conspirators: if a pirate key is generated by k traitors out of a static set of ℓ legitimate
users, then all traitors can be identified given the pirate key. In this paper we address three practicality
and security issues of the Boneh-Franklin traitor-tracing scheme. In the first place, without changing
the original scheme, we modify its tracing procedure in the non-black-box model such that it allows
identification of k traitors in time O˜(k2), as opposed to the original tracing complexity O˜(ℓ). This new
tracing procedure works independently of the nature of the Reed-Solomon code used to watermark
private keys. As a consequence, in applications with billions of users it takes just a few minutes on a
common desktop computer to identify large collusions. Secondly, we exhibit the lack of practical value
of list-decoding algorithms to identify more than k traitors. Finally, we show that 2k traitors can derive
the keys of all legitimate users and we propose a fix to this security issue.
Key words: Boneh-Franklin traitor tracing, Reed-Solomon codes, Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, Gu-
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1 Introduction
Consider the following scenario: a center broadcasts data to ℓ receivers where only authorized users
(typically, those who have paid a fee) should have access to the data. A way to realize this, widely
deployed in commercial Pay-TV systems, is to encrypt the data using a symmetric key and to
securely transmit to each authorized receiver this key which will be stored in a tamper-proof piece
of hardware, like a smart card.
Unfortunately, tamper-resistant hardware is very difficult and costly to design, since it is vul-
nerable to a wide variety of attacks (see [1,27] as two good starting points). As a result, a malicious
user (hereafter called a traitor) can attempt to retrieve the decryption key from his receiver and,
if successful, distribute it (sell or give away) to unauthorized users (the pirates). Depending on the
nature of the encryption schemes in use, we can even imagine situations where a dishonest user will
try to mix several legitimate keys in order to build a new one and embed it in a pirate receiver.
The problem of identifying which receivers were compromised or which secret keys have leaked
is called traitor tracing. Usually, two modes of traitor tracing are considered: in the black-box model,
the tracing algorithm sends crafty ciphertexts to the pirate receiver and aims at determining which
keys it uses while observing its behavior; in the non-black-box model, we assume that the keys
can be extracted from the pirate receiver and are known to the tracing algorithm. The black-box
model is widely considered by the cryptographic community as being a standard security model
for evaluating traitor-tracing schemes security. However, based on our practical experience, we
know that it is reasonable to assume that a tracing authority has at least the same technological
and financial resources to reverse-engineer a pirate receiver as a traitor had, to perform the same
operation on a legitimate receiver.
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1.1 Related Work
Fiat and Naor introduced the concept of broadcast encryption in [17]. In their model4, there exists a
set of ℓ authorized users and the broadcasting center can dynamically specify a privileged subset of
authorized users that can decrypt selected ciphertexts (like high-value content, for instance). Later,
Chor, Fiat, and Naor [12] introduced the concept of traitor-tracing to overcome decryption key
piracy in broadcast encryption schemes. Their scheme (which was improved by Naor and Pinkas
in [13, 33]) is k-collusion resistant (or k-resilient) in the sense that at least one traitor can be
identified with high probability given a pirate key generated by up to k traitors. Naor, Naor and
Lotspiech presented more efficient broadcast encryption schemes [32] with tracing capabilities; it
was however demonstrated by Kiayias and Pehlivanoglu [21] that the iterative nature of the tracing
procedure allows a pirate to significantly leverage the compromise of a few keys. Although broadcast
encryption and traitor-tracing are orthogonal problems in nature, and thus frequently studied
separately, they are in practice indivisible: some trace-and-revoke schemes have been proposed
accordingly [15, 16], culminating in [9]. The latter scheme, though resistant to any collusion size,
is geared towards small-scale systems and impractical for the systems of tens of millions of users
that we are dealing with and that inspired this paper; this is mainly due to the O(
√
ℓ) complexity
of [9] in terms of key storage and bandwidth requirements. Additionally, the tracing costs are O(ℓ2),
which also severely limits its applicability.
Kurosawa and Desmedt [24] proposed a public-key traitor tracing scheme, which was later broken
by Stinson and Wei [40]. Boneh and Shaw [8] discussed collusion-resistant schemes for fingerprinting
digital data based on error-correcting codes. Boneh and Franklin [5] proposed a new public-key
traitor-tracing scheme also based on error-correcting codes, more precisely on Reed-Solomon codes.
Actually, the traitor-tracing problem can be interpreted as an application of watermarking to
secret keys that are distributed among users. The Boneh-Franklin non-black-box traitor tracing
scheme is k-collusion resistant and deterministic in the sense that all of the traitors are identified
with probability 1 if at most k of them collude to derive new pirate keys. The fastest claimed
running time of the non-black-box tracing algorithm is O(ℓ log ℓ log log ℓ) while the best known
black-box tracing method has an exponential complexity O(
(
ℓ
k
)
k2). Kurosawa and Yoshida [25] have
generalized the Kurosawa-Desmedt and Boneh-Franklin schemes. The technique used by Boneh and
Franklin to watermark private keys has since been re-used by Kiayias and Yung [23] to design an
asymmetric5 public-key traitor tracing scheme; other examples of Reed-Solomon codes use include
schemes designed by Dodis et al. [15,16]. Recently, Boneh et al. [7] have presented a fully-collusion
resistant traitor tracing scheme which has private keys of constant size and ciphertexts of size
O(
√
ℓ). Finally, the low efficiency of tracing procedures in traitor tracing schemes has been addressed
by Silverberg et al. in [37,38]. The authors present several schemes based on algebraic codes which
enable traitors to be traced in time polynomial in k2 log ℓ. Recently, Billet and Phan [2] and Boneh
and Naor [6] have independently proposed traitor-tracing schemes with constant size ciphertexts
and having a black-box tracing complexity of O(t2ℓ log ℓ) and O(t4 log ℓ), respectively.
4 Note that in this paper, we will only consider stateless receivers, i.e., receivers for which it is not possible to
guarantee synchronism with the broadcast center and which are resettable. Broadcast encryption schemes for
stateful receivers have been proposed in [41,44].
5 Asymmetric traitor tracing is a variant introduced by Pfitzmann [35] where the broadcasting center is not nec-
essarily trusted, thus the tracing procedure must produce undeniable evidence of the implication of the traitor
subscribers.
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1.2 Our Contributions
While we agree that improving the exponential complexity of black-box tracing as cited above
would be a very worthwhile cause to pursue, we choose to focus in this paper, in the light of the
negative results obtained by Kiayias and Yung [22], on some security and efficiency issues that we
encountered in practical applications of the Boneh-Franklin traitor-tracing scheme [5] in the non-
black-box model. Although Boneh-Franklin traitor-tracing is one of the most elegant and efficient
public-key traitor tracing schemes, it suffers from certain issues that limit its practical applicability
in large-scale systems. We point out what the problems are and how they can be addressed. As
usual, ℓ denotes the number of legitimate users and k the collusion threshold.
Complexity of Non-Black-Box Tracing One of the issues is the complexity of the non-black-
box traitor tracing procedure which depends on ℓ. This is a major drawback when applied to
systems of many millions of users, since tracing would require large computational power, or could
even be infeasible in practice. We dissect the way Reed-Solomon codes are used to watermark
private keys, and we show that, contrary to what is suggested in [5], it is possible to trace in time6
O˜(k2), i.e., with a complexity independent of ℓ, using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm instead of
the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. Although both algorithms require the same complexity to fully
recover a noisy Reed-Solomon codeword, the complexity of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm can
be reduced if used for tracing only. The resulting new tracing procedure does not require any
modification of the original Boneh-Franklin scheme. In practice, it takes us just a few minutes on
a common desktop PC to trace large coalitions in systems having hundreds of millions of users.
Our result improves the results obtained by Silverberg et al. [37, 38]. Our finding also applies to
schemes using the same watermarking technique, such as the ones described in [15,16,23]. Another
immediate benefit we identify is the possibility to use Reed-Solomon codes optimized specifically
to allow faster decryption. In practice, for large systems and coalitions of medium size, we speed
up the decryption by almost an order of magnitude.
Above-Threshold Tracing Secondly, we raise an issue concerning the above-threshold security
of the Boneh-Franklin scheme and its variants. We show that the list-decoding techniques, such as
the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm, as advocated by Boneh-Franklin to trace more than k traitors,
detect only a few additional traitors, and this at a high cost.
Beyond-Threshold Tracing Finally, we show that if an adversary is able to recover 2k secret
keys, then she is able to compute any other secret key, including the uncompromised ones. Thus,
in this case the security of the system completely collapses. This somewhat embarrassing property
is primarily due to the fact that the linear tracing code is public. We show how this issue can be
addressed at the cost of keeping more than a single secret value in the receivers.
This paper is organized as follows. In §2 we review the Boneh-Franklin scheme [5]. Then, in
§3, we speed up both its codeword generation and tracing procedures. In §4 we discuss the above-
threshold tracing based on the Guruswami-Sudan list-decoding algorithm, while in §5 we study the
security of the Boneh-Franklin scheme when the number of recovered secret keys is at least twice
the allowed threshold.
6 Here, the O˜(n) notation hides the terms which are poly-logarithmic in n.
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2 Boneh-Franklin Scheme
This section describes the Boneh-Franklin traitor tracing scheme [5] by first defining its encryption
and decryption procedures, then by explaining the codeword generation mechanism and finally by
describing the underlying non-black-box tracing mechanism. We adopt the notation used in [5]
denoting by ℓ the number of users in the system and by k the maximal coalition size. Hence, the
described scheme is supposed to be secure against any collusion of at most k users.
2.1 Encryption/Decryption
Let Gq denote a group of prime order q in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem [4] is hard.
Typically, Gq is a subgroup of order q of Z
∗
p, where p is prime and q|p− 1; alternatively, Gq can be
a group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field.
The key generation process proceeds as follows. Let g be a generator of Gq. For 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k,
let rj ∈R Z/qZ and compute hj = grj . The public key is defined as 〈y, h1, . . . , h2k〉 ∈ G2k+1q where
y =
∏2k
j=1 h
αj
j ∈ Gq for random αj ∈R Z/qZ. Here, we say that the vector α = 〈α1, . . . , α2k〉
is a representation of y with respect to the base 〈h1, . . . , h2k〉. Note that if ρ(1), . . . ,ρ(n) are n
representations of the same element of Gq with respect to the same base, then so is any convex
combination
∑n
i=1 ηiρ
(i) of the representations, where ηi ∈ Z/qZ are scalars such that
∑n
i=1 ηi = 1.
Let Γ = {γ(1), . . . ,γ(ℓ)} be a linear space tracing code, i.e., a collection of ℓ codewords γ(i),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, where each γ(i) = 〈γ(1)j , . . . , γ(2k)j 〉 is a 2k-dimensional vector over Z/qZ. The set Γ
is fixed in advance and not secret, and can thus be considered as being a public parameter of the
Boneh-Franklin traitor tracing scheme. We detail in §2.2 the codeword generation process from [5].
In §3.2 we propose a slightly different way to define Γ that has interesting practical consequences.
A private key is an element θi ∈ Z/qZ such that θi · γ(i) is a representation of y with respect to
the base 〈h1, . . . , h2k〉. Thus, the i-th private key θi can be derived from the i-th codeword γ(i) as
θi =
∑2k
j=1 rjαj∑2k
j=1 rjγ
(i)
j
, (1)
where, obviously, the calculation takes place in Z/qZ. To encrypt a message m ∈ Gq, one picks
a random a ∈R Z/qZ and calculates the ciphertext as 〈m · ya, ha1 , . . . , ha2k〉. Given a ciphertext
〈s, p1, . . . , p2k〉, and the i-th secret key θi, the message m can be recovered as:
m =
s(∏2k
j=1 p
γ
(i)
j
j
)θi . (2)
The correctness follows in a straightforward way from the fact that θi · γ(i) is a representation of y
with respect to the base 〈h1, . . . , h2k〉. It follows that it is possible to decrypt a ciphertext given any
representation 〈δ1, . . . , δ2k〉 of y with respect to the base 〈h1, . . . , h2k〉, since
∏2k
j=1(h
a
j )
δj = ya; in
other words, to decrypt it suffices to have a representation of y with respect to the base 〈h1, . . . , h2k〉.
Interestingly, Boneh and Franklin show in [5, Lemma 1] that if it is infeasible to compute discrete
logarithms in Gq, then convex combinations of n < 2k given representations ρ
(1), . . . ,ρ(n) of y are
the only representations of y that can efficiently be constructed.
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2.2 Codewords Generation
We describe the codewords γ(i) generation process from [5] which is based on the use of Reed-
Solomon codes [36]. Given the (ℓ− 2k)× ℓ matrix
A =


1 1 1 . . . 1
1 2 3 . . . ℓ
12 22 32 . . . ℓ2
...
...
...
...
1ℓ−2k−1 2ℓ−2k−1 3ℓ−2k−1 . . . ℓℓ−2k−1

 mod q (3)
over Z/qZ, let b1, . . . , b2k be a basis of the nullspace of A. Boneh and Franklin define Γ as the rows
of the ℓ× 2k matrix
B =

 | | | |b1 b2 b3 . . . b2k
| | | |

 , (4)
also over Z/qZ. Thus, Γ contains ℓ codewords each of length 2k. By observing that any vector in
the span of the rows of A corresponds to a polynomial of degree at most ℓ−2k−1 evaluated at the
points 1, . . . , ℓ, one can construct a basis of the nullspace of A using Lagrange interpolation. Using
this construction the i-th codeword becomes 〈ui, iui, i2ui, . . . , i2k−1ui〉 where u−1i =
∏
j 6=i(i−j) and
all computations are in Z/qZ. Naive computation of the ℓ codewords requires Ω(ℓ2) operations in
Z/qZ. This can easily be turned into O(ℓ) operations using the following recursive formula:
u−11 =
ℓ−1∏
j=1
(−j) and u−1i+1 =
ui(i− 1)
i− ℓ for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1. (5)
2.3 Tracing Procedure
We briefly recall the non-black-box tracing procedure [5]. Let d ∈ (Z/qZ)2k be a vector formed by
taking a linear combination of at most k vectors in Γ . In practice d will be a convex combination,
but we do not need that here. Since the vectors in Γ form the rows of the matrix B, we know
there exists a vector w ∈ (Z/qZ)ℓ (having Hamming weight at most k) such that wB = d. The
tracing procedure then works as follows. First, we determine a vector7 v ∈ (Z/qZ)ℓ such that
vB = d. Since (v −w)B = 0, we know that v −w lies in the linear span of the rows of A (recall
that the rows of A span the vector space orthogonal to the one spanned by the columns of B).
In other words, there exists a unique polynomial f of degree at most ℓ − 2k − 1 over Z/qZ such
that v −w = 〈f(1), . . . , f(ℓ)〉. Taking into account that w has Hamming weight of at most k, we
know that 〈f(1), . . . , f(ℓ)〉 equals v in all but at most k components. Hence, it is possible to use
Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [42] to find f from v, after which f gives us v − w, from which we
recover w. The Berlekamp-Welch algorithm, published in a patent [42] granted in 1986, runs in
O(ℓ2). Asymptotically faster variants exist (see [3]), the fastest known being the one described by
Pan [34] which runs in O(ℓ log ℓ log log ℓ).
As mentioned in §1.1, the best known black-box tracing procedure for the Boneh-Franklin
scheme is not efficient since it has a O(
(ℓ
k
)
k2) complexity. We refer the reader to [5] for its descrip-
tion since it is out of the scope of this paper. Furthermore, we note that the black-box tracing
7 Note that several such vectors exist.
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procedure is vulnerable to the attacks described by Kiayias and Yung [22] which demonstrate
that the Boneh-Franklin scheme is essentially incapable of black-box tracing super-logarithmic self-
protecting traitor collusions unless the ciphertext size is linear in the number of users. Those two
facts considerably limit the application of black-box tracing with the Boneh-Franklin scheme.
3 Revisiting the Tracing Mechanism
We recall several notions from coding theory. A linear code C over the vector space (Z/qZ)ℓ is a
subspace of (Z/qZ)ℓ. For our purposes we may assume that C has dimension 2k with 0 ≤ 2k ≤ ℓ.
It follows that C contains q2k codewords. The minimal distance d of C is the minimum Hamming
weight of its non-zero codewords. A code C is called maximum-distance separable (MDS ) if its
minimal distance reaches the Singleton bound, i.e., if d = ℓ− 2k+1. A 2k× ℓ matrix G over Z/qZ
is called a generator matrix or encoding matrix for C if its rows form a linearly independent basis
for C. Thus, C = {x ∈ (Z/qZ)ℓ : x = zG where z ∈ (Z/qZ)2k} and C is the code associated to G.
The dual code C⊥ of a linear code C is the linear code C⊥ = {x ∈ (Z/qZ)ℓ : xcT = 0 for all c ∈ C}.
A reduced parity-check matrix for the code C is an (ℓ − 2k) × ℓ matrix H over Z/qZ such that
C = {x ∈ (Z/qZ)ℓ : xHT = 0}. Receiving a noisy version x˜ of a codeword x, the vector s = x˜HT
is called the syndrome. Writing x˜ = x + e, where e is called the error pattern, we see that the
syndrome s = (x+ e)HT = 0 + eHT = eHT depends only on the error pattern, and not on the
codeword itself. Finally, the following lemma makes clear the link between a reduced parity-check
matrix of a linear code and its dual code.
Lemma 1. H is a parity-check matrix for the linear code C if and only if C spans the subspace
orthogonal to the row space of H.
Therefore, a reduced parity-check matrix for C is an encoding matrix for the dual code C⊥ and
conversely.
3.1 Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes
Given vectors π = (πi)
ℓ
i=1, c = (ci)
ℓ
i=1 ∈ (Z/qZ)ℓ, a Generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSℓ,2k(π, c)
is defined as follows:
GRSℓ,2k(π, c) =
{
(cif(πi))
ℓ
i=1 : f(x) ∈ (Z/qZ)[x] and deg(f) < 2k
}
. (6)
Thus, a codeword in GRSℓ,2k(π, c) is a vector consisting of a polynomial of degree less than 2k
over Z/qZ evaluated at the ℓ points π1, . . . , πℓ scaled by c1, . . . , cℓ. It is well-known that GRS codes
are MDS codes, i.e., d = ℓ− 2k + 1. When c = (1, 1, . . . , 1), we speak of Reed-Solomon codes. The
following theorem states that the dual of a GRS code is a GRS code (see [20, page 66] for a proof).
Theorem 1. The dual of a GRSℓ,2k(π, c) code is
GRSℓ,2k(π, c)
⊥ = GRSℓ,ℓ−2k(π,d) (7)
where d = (d1, . . . , dℓ) with d
−1
i = ci
∏
j 6=i(πi − πj).
The above allows us to rephrase the Boneh-Franklin codeword generation mechanism described
in §2.2 as follows: the matrix A defined in (3) is the generator matrix of a GRSℓ,ℓ−2k(π, c) code
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over Z/qZ with π = (1, . . . , ℓ) and c = (1, 1, . . . , 1) (this fact was already recognized by [23], for
instance), while the matrix B defined in (4) is a (transposed) reduced parity-check matrix for the
same code. Conversely, in the light of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, the matrix BT can be seen as a
generator matrix of the dual GRSℓ,2k(π,d) of GRSℓ,ℓ−2k(π, c), where d is as in Theorem 1. Thus, Γ
consists of vectors forming a basis of the 2k-dimensional vector space which contains the syndromes
of GRSℓ,ℓ−2k(π, c).
3.2 More Efficient Codewords
The above more general framework allows us to define the code Γ in such a way that both the
codeword generation and decryption become faster without affecting the security of the Boneh-
Franklin scheme.
Using Theorem 1, we observe that in order to compute the codewords we can avoid Lagrange
interpolation and recursive formula (5): let B be the generator matrix of a GRSℓ,2k(π,d) code
with π = (1, 2, . . . , ℓ) and d = (1, 1, . . . , 1), then the i-th codeword can simply be defined as
γ(i) = 〈1, i, i2, . . . , i2k−1〉, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. This in turn allows us to rewrite the decryption
operation (2) as
m =
s(∏2k
j=1 p
ij−1
j
)θi = s((((
pi2kp2k−1
)i
. . .
)i
p2
)i
p1
)θi . (8)
Compared to (2), this replaces 2k of the 2k + 1 log2 q-bit modular exponentiation exponents by
log2 ℓ-bit ones. With ℓ ≈ 220 and assuming 80-bit security with 160-bit q, this results in a speedup
by a factor of 7, which is much more effective than using multi-exponentiations (cf. [30, page 617])
as suggested in [5]. In practice, the efficiency of our decryption is comparable to [29]. Furthermore,
provided each receiver knows its identity number i, it can directly compute codeword γ(i) without
requiring knowledge of the Lagrange coefficients attached to the receiver with identity i− 1.
We note that the semantic security of the Boneh-Franklin scheme is not impacted by the nature
of the code, while its tracing capabilities only depend on the minimal distance of the code. In our
case, we use Generalized Reed-Solomon codes with the same minimal distance as the one used by
Boneh and Franklin.
3.3 An Efficient Tracing Procedure
In this section, we present in two steps a new and efficient non-black-box tracing procedure for
the Boneh-Franklin scheme. We stress that this new tracing procedure can be used for any type of
Reed-Solomon and generalized Reed-Solomon codes, being the original code described in [5], the
faster code discussed in §3.2 or the variant we will discuss in §5. First, we reduce the complexity
from O(ℓ log ℓ log log ℓ) to O(ℓ), using a technique based on the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [28]
and Chien search [11]. Then, we improve it to expected complexity O˜(k2) by replacing Chien search
by the Cantor-Zassenhaus factorization algorithm [10]
As outlined in §2.3, the Boneh-Franklin tracing procedure based on Berlekamp-Welch algo-
rithm consists in finding a noisy codeword which results in the syndrome discovered in the pirate
receiver, and in decoding this codeword. More precisely, let x and x˜ denote a codeword belonging
to GRSℓ,ℓ−2k(π, c) with c = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and its noisy version, respectively. We can interpret both
x and x˜ as polynomials f(x) and f˜(x) in (Z/qZ)[x]. If no error is introduced in the codeword,
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then dif(πi) = f˜i for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, where f˜(x) =
∑ℓ
i=1 f˜ix
i−1. Let g(x) ∈ (Z/qZ)[x] be a polynomial
(hereafter called an error-locator polynomial) of degree at most k with g(πi) = 0 for those πi’s
for which dif(πi) 6= f˜i. This leads to the following system of ℓ linear equations in ℓ unknowns:
dif(πi)g(π) = g(π)f˜i. Solving the system, one obtains the polynomial g(x), from which the error
locations can be derived. Along with g(x), one also gets dif(x)g(x) and thus f(x). Straightforward
implementation using Gaussian reduction would lead to O(ℓ3) complexity. Faster approaches would
be to use the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm in O(ℓ2) or others of complexity O˜(ℓ) (see [3, 34,42]).
The key observation to derive a faster tracing algorithm is to note that computing a (noisy)
codeword from the syndrome retrieved from a pirate receiver and then decoding this codeword, as
done above, is not necessary: actually, the pirate syndrome itself suffices to trace the legitimate
syndromes used to derive it. Indeed, as pointed out by Massey [28], the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
allows reconstruction of the error-locator polynomial from the syndrome only. This key property
permits us to stop the decoding process earlier for the purpose of tracing and thus reduce the
complexity, since we are interested in the error-locator polynomial only and we do not need the
amplitudes of the errors.
We now clarify the link between the error-locator polynomial and the syndrome, following [43,
page 214]. Let f˜(x) = f(x)+e(x), where f˜(x), f(x) and e(x) are the received codeword, the original
codeword, and the error polynomial, respectively. Let s(x) = s0+ s1x+ · · ·+ s2k−1x2k−1 denote the
syndrome vector interpreted as a polynomial. Let g(x) denote an error-locator polynomial whose
zeroes are the inverses of the error locations σj = πi with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and with i ∈ I for a cardinality
k subset I of {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}:
g(x) =
k∏
j=1
(1− σjx) = g0 + g1x+ · · · + gkxk. (9)
Let t1, t2, . . . , tk be the indices of the non-zero coefficients of e(x). Because g(σ
−1
m ) = 0 for all error
locations σm with 1 ≤ m ≤ k, it follows that etmσjmg(σ−1m ) = 0, and thus
etm(gkσ
−k+j
m + gk−1σ
−k+j+1
m + · · ·+ g1σj−1m + g0σjm) = 0 (10)
for any j. Summing (10) over m = 1, 2, . . . k gives an expression from which Newton’s identities
can be constructed:
∑k
m=1 etm(gkσ
−k+j
m + gk−1σ
−k+j+1
m + · · ·+ g1σj−1m + g0σjm)
= gk
∑k
m=1 etmσ
j−k
m + gk−1
∑k
m=1 etmσ
j−k+1
m + · · · + g0
∑k
m=1 etmσ
j
m
= gksj−k + gk−1sj−k+1 + · · ·+ g1sj−1 + g0sj = 0.
The last equality comes from the fact that the following system of equations can be written using
the parity-check matrix:
s0 = et1 + et2 + · · ·+ etk
s1 = et1σ1 + et2σ2 + · · ·+ etkσk
s2 = et1σ
2
1 + et2σ
2
2 + · · · + etkσ2k
. . .
s2k−1 = et1σ
2k−1
1 + et2σ
2k−1
2 + · · ·+ etkσ2k−1k .
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From (9) it follows that g0 = 1, which leads to the order k linear recurrence relation
gksj−k + · · ·+ g1sj−1 = −sj. (11)
Given 2k consecutive terms of an order k linear recurrence, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm com-
putes the coefficients of the recurrence in time O(k2). Because the si for i = 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1 are
known, the gi can thus be computed directly in time O(k
2).
After the error-locator polynomial g(x) has been computed, the remaining task consists in find-
ing its roots, which are the inverses of identities of the traitors. Traditionally, Reed-Solomon de-
coders rely on the Chien search algorithm [11] which searches over the possible roots. In our case, this
results in a complexity of O(ℓ). The roots can, however, be located faster by factorizing g(1/x) us-
ing the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [10] within expected time O(k2 log k log log k(log q+log k)) =
O˜(k2). This algorithm works recursively on the squarefree polynomial g(x) whose irreducible fac-
tors8 are all of degree 1. It is based on the fact9 that g(x) = gcd(g(x), r(x)) ·gcd(g(x), r(x)(pd−1)/2+
1) · gcd(g(x), r(x)(pd+1)/2 − 1) for any polynomial r(x) ∈ (Z/qZ)[x].
Then, the obtained roots directly reveal the identities of the traitors. The overall complexity of
our tracing procedures is O˜(k2) which is independent of ℓ. The latter is not the case for the schemes
based on algebraic codes described by Silverberg et al. in [37,38].
Our method makes it possible to trace large coalitions in Boneh-Franklin systems with a virtually
unlimited number of users, and this without requiring any modification of the encryption scheme.
Our implementation, based on the GMP [31] and LiDIA [26] software libraries and working over
the group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field of cardinality approximately 2160, allows
tracing of a coalition of k = 1024 traitors in a system of ℓ = 200′000′000 users in less than two
minutes on a common desktop PC. These parameter values cannot realistically be handled using
the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm as described in [5].
4 Above-Threshold Tracing
In [5] Boneh and Franklin emphasize an interesting property of their scheme, namely the possibility
to trace a collusion of more than k traitors using list-decoding techniques like the Guruswami-Sudan
algorithm [18,19]. This would correspond to finding more than k errors in a codeword. In such cases,
the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm fails to find the polynomial f(x). The Berlekamp-Massey approach
fails as well, since it outputs a polynomial of degree k that does not have k roots over Z/qZ. The
algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan allows, under certain circumstances, to find a candidate for the
polynomial f(x). In this section we investigate under which circumstances tracing is possible and
how it will influence system parameters. We finally show that the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm can
detect only a few additional traitors, and this at high cost.
4.1 Guruswami-Sudan Algorithm for Reed-Solomon Codes
This algorithm attempts to find the message polynomial f(x) given a received codeword when more
than k errors occurred. It can be thought of as a generalization of the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm.
Let ℓ and k be as above. Given ℓ pairs (πi, ci) ∈ (Z/qZ)2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, message length ℓ − 2k,
and an error parameter k′ ≤ ℓ − 1 −√ℓ(ℓ− 2k − 1), the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm finds all
8 g(x) in fact fulfills these conditions if g(x) has at most k roots.
9 The interested reader will find more details about the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm in [14, page 128].
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univariate polynomials f of degree at most ℓ− 2k− 1 such that f(πi) = ci for at least ℓ− k′ values
of i. Thus, the algorithm allows correction of at most k′ errors. It consists of two steps. In the first
step a parameter r is selected and a system of O(ℓr2) linear equations is solved to find a non-zero
bivariate polynomial Q(x, y) of a certain weighted degree10 such that Q(πi, ci) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
The parameter r, which is the multiplicity of the singularity of Q(x, y), is chosen in such a way
that as many errors as possible can be handled while keeping the system of equations tractable. In
the second step, factors (y− f(x)) of Q(x, y) are determined such that deg(f(x)) ≤ ℓ− 2k− 1. For
a complete description of the method see [18,19]. Below we are interested in its practical feasibility
(in particular of the first step) in the context of the traitor tracing problem.
4.2 List Decoding and Traitor Tracing
In this section we have a closer look at the various parameters of of the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm.
We will see that this leads to the unavoidable conclusion that it is of little practical significance for
our type of applications.
Since the traditional algorithms (such as Berlekamp-Welch) can trace up to k traitors, the only
case of interest is k′ > k. Let δ = k′ − k be the number of additional traitors we wish to be able to
trace, and let φ = ℓ− 2k − 1. Because at most ℓ− 1−√ℓφ traitors can be traced, only k’s need to
be considered for which
k + δ ≤ ℓ− 1−
√
ℓφ (12)
for a δ ≥ 1.
With ω = r(ℓ− k − δ)− 1, in the first step of the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm a system needs
to be solved over Z/qZ involving ℓr(r + 1)/2 constraints and(
ω + 1− φ
2
⌊
ω
φ
⌋)(⌊
ω
φ
⌋
+ 1
)
unknowns [18,19]. It follows that(
ω + 1− φ
2
⌊
ω
φ
⌋)(⌊
ω
φ
⌋
+ 1
)
≥ ℓr(r + 1)
2
. (13)
Furthermore, since in practice q will have at least 160 bits, it is reasonable to limit the number of
constraints to 10000 if we want to be able to store the matrix in 2GB of memory. This leads to
ℓ(r + 1)r
2
< 10000. (14)
Note that this immediately limits the practical applicability of the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm
to tracing in systems of at most a few thousand users. This is in sharp contrast with our syndrome-
only tracing which allows millions of users.
Define the minimal coalition size as the smallest k such that (12), (13), and (14) are satisfied.
For any ℓ and δ, this k follows from a simple search, as illustrated in Fig. 1 for several (small)
numbers of users. For example, in a system with ℓ = 512 users the minimal initial coalition size is
69 in order to be able to trace a single additional key if 70 pirates collude. In many applications, this
results in an overkill, because the ciphertext and private key, which are dependent on the coalition
10 degx(Q(x, y))m+ degy(Q(x, y))n is called the (m,n)-weighted degree of Q(x, y).
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size, become too large. As illustration, let us consider the following case: for ℓ = 1024 and k = 500,
we get k+ δ = 855, which may seem fairly good. However, the required bandwidth to transmit the
ciphertext is equal to 1001 group elements. This is only 2.24% less than a trivial scheme involving
an individual encryption based on El-Gamal which additionally would bring natural revocation
capabilities. Besides that, a system of size ℓ = 1024 is not far from the limit capacity of the original
Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. Hence this method is not applicable for systems with large number of
users, constrained bandwidth and key-space storage capability.
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Fig. 1. Minimal coalition with respect to a given above-threshold tracing capacity
5 Beyond-Threshold Security
In practical scenarios, there are three distinct cases for the number of compromised keys in a
coalition, namely: at most k, between k + 1 and 2k − 1, and 2k keys or more. The first case
corresponds to the situation for which the Boneh-Franklin scheme has been designed and security
guarantees have been derived, while the second case corresponds to the above-threshold tracing
scenario described in §4. In this section we discuss the third case.
Suppose that an adversary has managed to get 2k private elements θis , for 1 ≤ s ≤ 2k and
assume, as before, that the vectors in Γ are public. Because Eq. (1) over Z/qZ can be rewritten as
θ−1is =
∑2k
j=1 rjγ
(is)
j∑2k
j=1 rjαj
=
2k∑
j=1
ωjγ
(is)
j (15)
with ωj = rj/
∑2k
j=1 rjαj , knowledge of the 2k private keys θis leads to a system of 2k linear
equations in the 2k unknowns ωj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k. After determining the ωj’s using for instance
Gaussian reduction, the adversary can compute any other private key θi in the system:
θi =

 2k∑
j=1
ωjγ
(i)
j


−1
.
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Not only will the adversary be able to create any number of untraceable combinations of keys, but
he will also be able to distribute newly derived keys so that innocent users (whose keys were a priori
never compromised) may be accused of treachery. We note that this observation applies not only
to the Boneh-Franklin scheme, but to many tracing schemes that are based on a publicly-known
linear code such as the generalizations described by Kurosawa and Yoshida [25].
An obvious way to repair this annoying property of the Boneh-Franklin scheme would require
keeping the tracing code matrix secret, while making sure that the vectors γ(i) = 〈γ(i)1 , . . . , γ(i)2k 〉
are statistically decorrelated. In that case acquiring 2k representations should give an adversary no
information about other representations. This idea was already used by Kiayias and Yung in [23] for
the different goal of obtaining an asymmetric traitor-tracing scheme. A way to achieve this would
be to choose the i-th codeword γ(i) as γ(i) = 〈1, ζi, . . . , ζ2k−1i 〉 where ζi ∈R Z/qZ with 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
is drawn independently and uniformly11 at random for each γ(i). Here, a GRSℓ,2k(π,d) code is
used, with π = (ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζℓ) and d = (1, 1, . . . , 1). The ith receiver has to protect the entire
representation 〈θiγ(i)1 , . . . , θiγ(i)2k 〉, and thus, to store at least θi and ζi in tamper-proof memory.
Furthermore, the fast codeword generation method from §3.2 can no longer be used.
By applying the above codeword distribution method, an adversary who acquires 2k or more
keys will be unable to derive any information about the tracing codewords that are used in the
representations. She will only be capable of creating combinations of the representations. If there
are fewer than k+1 keys in a combination, we are back to a standard tracing scenario. Otherwise,
combinations of k+1 or more keys will be detected, but not traceable, since our tracing algorithm
will be unable to factorize the error-locator polynomial nor the original approaches will reveal the
traitors.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented new insights as well as several improvements to the Boneh-Franklin
traitor tracing scheme [5]. First of all, we revisited the private key watermarking scheme based on
Reed-Solomon codes; based on this, we describe a new non-black-box tracing algorithm whose
complexity only depends on the square of the maximal coalition size k and is independent of the
total number ℓ of users. Our new tracing algorithm does not require any change in the encryption
scheme and can be used with any generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
This allows us to implement the scheme in a system with a virtually unlimited number of users;
in other words, the maximal coalition size is only constrained by the channel bandwidth and the
computational capacity of the receivers. This new tracing algorithm can also be applied with any
other scheme relying on (generalized) Reed-Solomon codes to watermark the distributed private
keys.
Additionally, we discussed the application of the Guruswami-Sudan list-decoding algorithm,
whose use was proposed in [5], and showed that, in practice, it brings only a marginal improvement
in tracing capabilities, and this at high cost.
Finally, we studied the above-threshold security of the Boneh-Franklin scheme, i.e., the malicious
capabilities of an adversary having access to many more than k keys. We showed that, given a
coalition size of k, an adversary who has recovered 2k private keys or more can derive any other
private key, provided the code Γ is publicly known, as advocated in [5]. To the best of our knowledge,
11 Note that for practical values of ℓ, a collision between two codewords has a negligible probability to occur.
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this ‘feature’ has not been reported in the literature. To deal with this problem, we suggest to keep
the tracing code matrix secret and to distribute statistically independent codewords to the receivers.
Even though the Boneh-Franklin scheme can encrypt only small messages (basically, one group
element), and even though using it in a hybrid fashion by encrypting a symmetric session key is
prone to a trivial untraceable strategy12, we believe based on our results that, in order to fight
illegitimate clones of tamper-proof modules, the Boneh-Franklin scheme is now really worth to be
considered in scenarios where trivial untraceable strategies are unavoidable13 by design. Of course,
this statement is based on the assumption that it is possible to revoke a traced clone by some other
mechanism.
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